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The Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) finding on no evidence of causality flowing 
from State fragility to classical corruption or extreme corruption could have an important 
influence on academic and policy debates. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African 
countries, we provide evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no 
violence and corruption-control (corruption). As a policy implication, the finding of the 
underlying paper maybe more expositional than factual and should be treated with caution.   
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 This note is a direct response to Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) who have 
concluded on no causality flowing from State fragility to classical corruption or extreme 
corruption. The paper concludes: “Robust empirical evidence shows a correlation between the 
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level of corruption and state fragility. In a further assessment with the econometrics of 
instrumental variables we ﬁnd evidence of causality neither ﬂowing from state fragility to 
classical corruption nor to extreme corruption” (p. 50).  We postulate that there should be 
significant causality for two main reasons. On the one hand, an atmosphere of political instability 
and/or State fragility should increase the confidence about less impunity and corruption-control 
because resources allocated in the fight against corruption may not be optimal. On the other hand, 
in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further increases corruption. 
Hence, two hypotheses result from the postulation. First, State fragility has a negative effect on 
corruption-control. Second, State fragility increases corruption.  
 It is important to investigate these hypotheses because the findings of the underpinnings 
paper could have an important influence on policy making decisions. The rest of the note is 
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis is 
covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with annual data from World Bank 
development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity begins from 1996 because 
corruption, corruption-control and political stability indicators are only available from this period. 
The scope of the African continent is consistent with the underlying study motivating this note. 
We measure State fragility with the political stability or no violence indicator. The corruption and 
corruption-control indices that are employed as dependent variables are in accordance with the 
hypotheses stipulated in the introduction. We control for government expenditure, trade 
openness, GDP per capita growth, inflation and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the first-
three control variables have been adopted by the underpinning study, we have added the last-two 
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for more subtlety in the analysis. Accordingly, the first specifications only involve the first-three 
while the last-two are included into the conditioning information set in the second specifications 
(see Table 1). 
 Before diving into the empirical specification, it is relevant to highlight the expected signs 
from the control variables. Government expenditure should increase corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 
2013, p. 2196;  Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008). Trade openness decreases corruption 
(Asongu, 2014; Asongu, 2012, p. 2178). Economic prosperity increases corruption (Asongu & 
Jellal, 2013, p. 2196; Asongu, 2013a, p. 63), decreases corruption-control (Asongu, 2013b, p. 44 
) and per capital economic prosperity also increases corruption (Asongu, 2013c, p. 16). From 
intuition, low inflation should be favorable to corruption-control while high inflation should not; 
essentially because in situations of soaring food prices, many citizens revert to corrupt means to 
make ends meet. Like trade openness, financial globalization (FDI) is also a powerful tool in the 
fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014). The definition of the variables, summary statistics and 
correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively.  
 In accordance with Asongu (2013d), we adopt a system Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) for three main reasons: it controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors, 
mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate 
cross-country variations. Hence, we prefer the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance 
with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4). The two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it 
controls for heteroscedasticity. Two tests are performed to assess the validity of the models. The 
Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test and the Sargan  overidentifying restrictions (OIR) 
test for the absence of autocorrelation and validity of instruments respectively. We control for 
time-effects and ensure the instruments are less than the number of cross-sections in the 
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specifications by using three-year non-overlapping intervals. Hence, the basic condition for using 
a GMM technique has been met: N>T (53>5). We do not provide the equations in levels and first 
difference because the GMM estimation technique is standard and well known. However, details 
of the specifications and equations could be provided or disclosed upon request.  
 
 
3. Empirical results  
 
 This section presents the findings of the two main hypotheses outlined in the introduction. 
As shown in Table 1 below, but for a thin exception (second specification of corruption), the 
models are overwhelmingly valid. This is essentially because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) 
and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most part
2
. Contrary to the findings of the 
underlying paper, the two hypotheses are validated, notably: (1) political stability increases 
corruption-control and; (2) political stability mitigates corruption. In the interpretation of the 
incidence on corruption, note should be taken of the fact that the corruption perception index 
(CPI) which is our indicator for corruption is measured in decreasing order by Transparency 
International. In this light, high CPI values imply low levels of corruption. The significant control 
variable has the expected sign. Accordingly, trade openness is a good tool in the fight against 
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 It should be recalled that, in order to examine the validity of the models, we have performed two tests, notably the 
Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the 
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uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the 
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (that is, they do not suffer from endogeneity). We only report AR(2) in 
difference because it is more relevant than the AR(1) which detects autocorrelation in levels. Overwhelmingly for 
almost all estimated models, we are neither able to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation  




Table 1: The effect of political stability on corruption and corruption-control  
         
 Corruption  Corruption-Control  
         
Corruption (-1) 0.655*** 0.445*** 0.793*** 0.533*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.003)     
Corruption Control (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.967** 1.057*** 0.648** 0.620*** 
     (0.013) (0.000) (0.023) (0.004) 
Constant  1.138* 2.072*** 0.677 1.696*** 0.089 0.134 -0.070 -0.084 
 (0.099) (0.002) (0.463) (0.002) (0.594) (0.381) (0.514) (0.400) 
Political Stability  0.304** 0.438** 0.245* 0.466*** 0.073 0.042 0.244 0.232** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.081) (0.002) (0.613) (0.717) (0.145) (0.028) 
Government Expenditure  -0.0008 -0.0006 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.0006 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.776) (0.863) (0.568) (0.824) (0.546) (0.785) (0.707) (0.973) 
Trade  0.001 0.003* -0.0003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0003 
 (0.336) (0.060) (0.935) (0.239) (0.241) (0.131) (0.523) (0.673) 
GDP per capita growth  -0.009 -0.003 -0.020 0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.676) (0.875) (0.451) (0.771) (0.475) (0.748) (0.913) (0.626) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.011 -0.006 --- --- 0.008 0.002 
   (0.653) (0.810)   (0.430) (0.737) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- --- 0.011 -0.001 --- --- 0.003 0.001 
   (0.554) (0.933)   (0.586) (0.755) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) -1.626 -1.865* -1.199 -1.581 -0.984 -0.908 -0.725 -1.112 
 (0.103) (0.062) (0.230) (0.113) (0.325) (0.363) (0.468) (0.265) 
Sargan OIR 9.496 3.372 11.265 7.483 6.428 5.669 10.231 7.217 
 (0.302) (0.908) (0.187) (0.485) (0.599) (0.684) (0.249) (0.513) 
Wald  (joint) 827.48*** 1184.31*** 2461.93*** 1330.5*** 323.64*** 486.39*** 268.54*** 426.43*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 17 16 19 14 17 16 19 
Countries 21 21 18 18 36 36 28 28 
Observations  70 70 63 63 128 128 100 100 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 




4. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
  
 The Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) finding on no evidence of causality 
flowing from State fragility to classical corruption or extreme corruption could have an important 
influence on academic and policy debates. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African 
countries, we have investigated two hypotheses to provide policy makers with the much needed 
guidance on the issue. We have postulated that on the one hand, an atmosphere of political 
instability and/or state fragility should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less 
corruption-control. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political 
instability further fuels corruption. Our findings have validated both hypotheses. Hence we have 
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provided evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence and 
corruption-control (corruption). Differences in findings could result from data, periodicity and 
methodological variations. Elucidating such variations is not within the scope of this note 
because its purpose has been to assess if the findings of the underpinning paper withstand more 
empirical scrutiny. As a policy implication, the finding of the underlying paper maybe more 











Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Corruption  Corruption Perception Index represents an aggregation of 
perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Corruption-Control Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Political Stability/ No 
violence   
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism. 
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Government Expenditure  Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
GDP per capita growth  Gross Domestic Product per capita growth rate (annual 
%) 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Investment   Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   







Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Corruption 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
Corruption Control -0.598 0.622 -2.344 0.971 265 
Political Stability  -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
GDP per capita growth rate  2.320 5.016 -11.248 38.258 257 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Foreign Direct Investment  4.706 11.354 -4.112 145.20 202 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
         
PolSta Gov. Exp. Trade  GDPpcg Inflation FDI Corruption C. Control  
1.000 -0.037 0.321 0.071 -0.098 0.012 0.673 0.691 PolSta 
 1.000 -0.070 0.245 -0.243 0.011 -0.095 0.056 Gov. Exp. 
  1.000 0.245 0.024 0.512 0.209 0.194 Trade 
   1.000 -0.105 0.577 0.077 -0.055 GDPpcg 
    1.000 0.041 -0.054 -0.121 Inflation 
     1.000 0.013 -0.045 FDI 
      1.000 0.896 Corruption 
       1.000 C. Control 
         
PolSta: Political Stability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. FDI: Foreign 
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